adopted by authors of major diplomatic history textbooks and accepted, albeit with reservations, by other scholars of the period. ' The notion that Antietam determined the fate of the mediation scheme of 1862is based upon two questionable assumptions. First, it assumes that the British expected that the looming Battle of Antietam would be a turning point in the war. The fact is that within the British Cabinet only Palmerston-and he only momentarily-thought in terms of a sweeping southern victory. Before the battle occurred, Palmerston and the rest of the Cabinet, including Russell and William E. Gladstone, the powerful chancellor of the exchequer, expected at most that there would be a serious northern military defeat but not one causing northern capitulation. Similarly, after news of the southern repulse reached London, no member of the Cabinet believed that the North was about to conquer the South. The Battle of Antietam rather reinforced the conviction that neither side would win the war on the field. of the futility of the war explains why the Cabinet was able to consider mediation at all. Clearly, expectation of a final victory for either side would have worked against consideration of a mediation scheme rather than for it.
The second assumption is that Palmerston had the ability to marshal Cabinet support for mediation. The coalition nature of Palmerston's ministry, the strong Cabinet rivalries, the Palmerston-Gladstone feud, the quasi-independence of Gladstone and Russell, and the power of the Conservatives in Parliament are all well known. Palmerston faced great political danger in proposing a policy which would have divided the Cabinet, and within the Cabinet the Duke of Argyll, Thomas Milner-Gibson, Sir George Grey, and Charles Pelham Villiers were northern sympathizers who could be counted on to oppose any policy hostile to the N~r t h .~ In addition, George Cornewall Lewis, Lord Granville, and the Duke of Newcastle consistently opposed changing British policy toward America. Since only Gladstone, Russell, and Lord Westbury were sympathetic to mediation, Palmerston had to move with exceptional caution. To gain support for mediation, he needed more than southern victories. Palmerston had to be able to convince the Cabinet that the North was in a mood to receive the British proposal.
Concern in the Cabinet over the mood and receptiveness of northerners to a British mediation offer was crucial during the entire consideration of the question. Palmerston 6 In late October William Stuart, British chargk d'daires in Washington, wrote Russell that Lincoln and the cabinet could be expected to reject a mediation offer and that it was "to the public, and not to the government that we must look, if we intend to proffer our services in the interest of peace." Stuart to Russell, October 26, 1862, Russell Pa ers, PRO 30/22/36. Among the early historians, Rhodes and Bancroft were virtu& alone in considering the importance of the American response, and both rested their interpretations heavily on British fear of Seward's reaction to a mediation roposal. Rhodes stated explicitly that "the change of opinion of Palmerston an8 Russell . . . .war not caused by the victo of Antis tam . . . ." Due to the la& of available material, neither historian co& fully de-
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that in such a situation northern war-weariness and pressure for peace would increase the political power of Republican moderates and Peace Democrats, who in combination would b e able to reduce the influence of the Radicals and force Lincoln and Seward against their personal inclinations to accept a mediation proposal. Throughout the fall of 1862 Cabinet members attempted to gauge American public opinion and measure its political effect. The military situation was important only as one element in shaping that judgment. Palmerston alone seems to have been primarily impressed with the military developments and to have fluctuated in his views toward the chances of successful mediation; the rest of the Cabinet remained constant to one position both before and after Antietam. to Gladstone, at a Cabinet meeting on August 2 it was decided "that nothing will be done until both parties are desirous of it."18 Within a few days Russell began to think that an opportunity for mediation might arise in the autumn. On July 1 William Stuart, British charge d'affaires in Washington, wrote of McClellan's difficulties in Virginia and of the optimism of Henri Mercier, French minister to the United States, that mediation would be welcomed in the North. Stuart himself wanted to wait for some great military disaster. Since the northerners were then still confident, he wrote, "it would perhaps be better for us to wait for some signs of exhaustion." Later in the month Stuart reported that Mercier, in reevaluating the northern temper, had suggested that "perhaps by October the change [in public opinion] may be sufficiently great for a joint mediation to have some chance to be listened to." Despite Lyons's renewed opposition to interference-he was then in England-the mention of October appealed to Palmerston and Russell. It conformed to Lyons's earlier suggestion that Britain act sometime between July and the elections in November. On August 6 Russell suggested calling a Cabinet meeting in October to decide the matter.14 Between August 6 and September 13 news from America indicated it was impossible to judge the state of the northern mind or the chances that a mediation proposal would have. The Duke of Argyll wrote Gladstone and Palmerston that while he himself believed that the North could not conquer the South, letters from America made it clear that "whatever may be our opinion of the prospects of 'the North' that they do not yet, at least, feel any approach to such exhaustion as will lead them to admit of mediation . . . . "16 Stuart, too, wrote Russell that "it will require further reverses before any offer of mediation would be listened to with patience," and Lord Clarendon, at this time a confidant of several Cabinet members, agreed in early September that there appeared "to be absolutely no basis for mediation with parties being animated by the fiercest passions, each demanding what the other will not concede. News of the Union defeat at the Second Battle of Bull Run and Lee's invasion of Maryland, however, led Palmerston, Russell, and Gladstone to believe that the time to act was rapidly approaching. On September 13 Russell instructed Lord Cowley, British ambassador to France, to sound out informally Bdouard Thouvenel, the French foreign minister, regarding a joint recommendation of an armistice to be followed by the threat that if the Union alone rejected it, Britain, France, Russia, Austria, and Italy "might" recognize the independence of the Confederacy. Such a recommendation, he thought, would "tend to shorten the war, & dispose the North to Peace."17 Russell thus conceived of a joint offer of mediation as a weapon to be used to bring the Americans to their senses. On the following day Paherston informed Russell of his agreement with this approach, noting that the Union had suffered "a very complete smashing" and faced worse disasters, including the possible loss of Washington or Baltimore.'' While awaiting Thouvenel's reply, Russell wrote Palmerston that he planned to call a Cabinet meeting on either September 23 or 30 to discuss mediation. He argued that "whether the Federal Army is destroyed or not it is clear that it is driven back to Washington, & has made no progress in subduing the Insurgent States." Significantly, Russell added that along with the proposal of mediation, British neutrality should be restated, and forces in Canada should be concentrated "in a few defensible points, before winter sets in."19 When Palmerston informed Gladstone of this position and added that the approaching battle in Maryland could decide matters and compel Britain to act before October, Gladstone quickly agreed. Palmerston noted that if McClellan were defeated, "the Federal Cause will be manifestly hopeless . ... "20
Other members of the Cabinet, however, opposed Russell's scheme, primarily because of their concern about the American reaction. Argyll wrote Gladstone that although he was now "doubly" convinced that the North could not subdue the South and had so written Charles Sumner and John Lothrop Motley, mediation would be successful only when the North became likewise convinced. That conviction, however, did not then exist.
While Cabinet members expressed their opposition to mediation, news arrived from Paris that France was also cool to the scheme. Stuart wrote on September 1 that Mercier wanted to wait "until after the Elections in November, which he thinks will bring out the real feelings of the people." Mercier made the same suggestion to Thouvenel, who, unlike Napoleon 111, was generally unsympathetic to interference. Cowley on September 18informed
Russell that Thouvenel, on the basis of Mercier's report, was also "disposed to wait to see the results of the election^."^^ Mercier had suggested to Thouvenel that although the moment for offering mediation had not arrived, when that time came "it might be only a fleeting moment which would be lost by a reference to London and Paris." Therefore, he wanted Lyons to return to America immediately with the power to make the offer at his own discretion. Mercier also suggested that Lyons's early return "might exercise a certain effect upon the public mind and prepare the people for mediation." In fact, Mercier hoped that "some means" could be developed to arouse the nation and promote the growth of a peace party which would be able to override Seward's expected opposition. Thouvenel fully accepted this plan, suggesting that Lyons return to Washington in October. The French minister believed that the scheme would be successful only if a strong peace party emerged with the power to "set aside" Lincoln and S e~a r d .~~ Lyons, however, disliked having such discretionary power since it could embarrass him in dealing with Seward, and Russell agreed that so important a move should only be decided upon in L~n d o n .~' Had the Cabinet not been so divided at that time on the wisdom of mediation, perhaps Russell would have considered Thouvenel's tactic, which was somewhat similar to his own. Under the existing circumstances, however, little consideration was given to the French scheme.
Palmerston also urged caution. On September 22 he advised Russell that Britain should await the outcome of the battle looming north of Washington and suggested that it would be premature to hold a Cabinet session on Russell's proposal before news arrived. Palmerston thought that northern determination would not flag until the northern army was "thoroughly beaten" and Baltimore had joined the Confederate cause. Then, he thought, northern leaders "may be brought to a more reasonable State of Mind." The next day Palmerston, after accepting Russell's general plan and suggesting that Russia be invited to enter the scheme, added, "If the Federals sustain a great Defeat they may be at once ready for Mediation and the Iron should be struck while it is hot. If, on the other hand, they should have the best of it we may wait awhile and see what may follow." On September 26 Russell wrote Cowley and Palmerston wrote Charles de Flahaut, French ambassador to the Court of St. James's, advising them of this position. 26 Significantly, even at this juncture neither Palmerston nor Russell expected that southern victory would cause a collapse of the northern military machine or compel the North to sue for peace. Palmerston clearly expected that, at most, northern leaders News of the Battle of Antietam arrived in England between September 30 and October 2, and between then and about October 25 the movement for mediation reached its climax. After hearing of Antietam Palmerston wrote Russell that the situation in America remained confused and the problems of offering mediation complex. The final decision, he thought, could "only be cleared up by some more decided events between the contending armies." His main point, however, was that the North would not consider mediation, especially on the basis of separation, until it had "had a good deal more pummelling from the South." By mid-October, he thought, Britain might be in a better position to act.29 Russell, however, was undeterred by Antietam.
On October 4, after hearing from Cowley that Napoleon I11 It was at this time that France made a formal request to Britain that it join with Russia in proposing to the Americans the establishment of a six-month truce accompanied by a suspension of the northern blockade. Napoleon 111 suggested that even if the offer were rejected by Lincoln, the peace party in the North would be strengthened and it might be able to overthrow the Lincoln government. Cowley's suggestion that Euro P e wait until after the elections was brushed aside, as apparent y were the objections of Napoleon's new foreign minister, fidouard Drouyn de Lhuys. Russell, however, saw enough merit in Napoleon's scheme to give it his support and to present it to the Cabinet on November 11.34
The Cabinet refused to agree to the French proposal. Palmerston, Clarendon, and Lewis continued to counsel waiting until after the American elections, and on November 8 Lord Napier telegraphed from St. Petersburg that Russia definitely would not join in the scheme. Russell was not as hopeful as he had been previously that it would be acceptable to the Arnericans before the elections, but he thought the attempt worthwhile nevertheless, especially since he had heard from Stuart that Seward "looks to mutual extermination, & to the superior numbers of the North, in order to restore the Union! ! !" In a note to Cowley, he asked, "Was there ever any war so horrible?" Russell on November 11 received firm support only from Gladstone and the lord chancellor, Lord Westbury. Palmerston supported Russell weakly, and on November 12 the Cabinet formally declined the French off Russell had hoped (and several others in the Cabinet expected) that the elections in America would quickly settle the question, and Russell instructed Lyons to report immediately his evaluation of the significance of the Democratic victories in New York and elsewhere when he returned to Ameri~a.~' Lyons's dispatches continued to counsel delay. He found that many people in New York, encouraged by Democratic successes, expected Lincoln to "strengthen the moderate and conservative element in the Cabinet" and to seek to conciliate the South in order to end the war. Some, however, believed that Lincoln had gone over to the Radicals and would soon replace Seward and other moderates with members of the "violent abolition party." Although Lyons avoided raising the question of foreign mediation with Democratic leaders, he learned that they were "very nervous on the subject," fearing that if Lincoln happened to be in the hands of the Radicals at the time mediation were proposed, the Radicals "would make use of the offer as a means of rousing the passions of the people, and . . . upsetting all the conservative plans . . . ." The Democrats, it appeared, would welcome a foreign mediation proposal only as a last resort, only if moderates gained control of the government, and only if the proposal came from "all the Powers of Europe." Lyons therefore suggested that Britain wait until March, when the new Congress met, or December, if there were sufficient military reverses to change the public temper.37
Throughout November and December Lyons continued to report that the time was not right to offer mediation. On November 14 he wrote that recognition of the South would provoke an Anglo-American war and hurt the growing peace party. In a dispatch ten days later he approved Russell's rejection of the French plan, and on November 28 he added that the publication of Seward's diplomatic correspondence for 1862 made it clear that mediation would have failed in O c t~b e r .~~ Upon his return to Washington Lyons met with Mercier, who was sorely disappointed at the failure of joint mediation. Mercier argued that an offer just before the election would have increased the Democratic majorities so that it would have become "impossible for the Government to reject the proposal." After the elections, however, the Radicals were even more deeply committed for political reasons to prosecute the war. Furthermore, they were compelling Lincoln, now completely under their control, to act "in defiance of public opinion." Lyons disagreed, suggesting that the Democrats were, in fact, ahead of public opinion before the election and might well have been forced to disavow their peaceful inclinations and repudiate med i a t i~n .~Ĩn answer to a request by Russell for information on the nature of northern confidence, Lyons reported that although "all men of all parties have lost heart about the war" and were "not confident of success," they still had not wholly reconciled themselves to defeat. Furthermore, the moderates had lost all hope of winning Lincoln's support. 40 In early January Lyons's position seemed to be justified, and he now placed no reliance on the Democrats. Even Mercier by that time had given up hope for Democratic support. Mercier complained to Lyons that the Democrats had reversed themselves on the question of mediation and peace. Before the elections Democratic spokesmen had assured him that a foreign proposal would gain them 800,000 votes. Now they appeared more warlike than the Radicals. Lyons also noted the new Democratic belligerency. He interpreted it to mean that the Democrats, believing that Republican power stemmed solely from control of the executive branch, had decided against exerting pressure on the government through Congress and were instead preparing to support the repudiated General McClellan and a peace platform in the 1864 elections. Popular dissatisfaction with Lincoln was growing, and they planned to allow the President full freedom to dig his own political grave. Lyons, therefore, expected that the Democrats would shy away from supporting foreign mediation so as not to arouse popular ill will toward them and give the Radicals a dangerous new means of attacking them.41 With the Radicals apparently in f i r m control of Lincoln and Seward and the Democratic peace elements in temporary retirement, there was not the slightest hope that foreign mediation would b e entertained for some time.
The failure of the mediation scheme, therefore, did not stem primarily from the military consequences or implications of the Battle of Antietam, which only indicated that the war would continue interminably and which thereby served to reinforce the arguments of those such as Russell and Gladstone who favored European intervention to end the war. Evidence suggests that, with the exception of Palmerston, Antietam was essentially irrelevant to the ultimate decision to postpone offering mediation.
Even for Palmerston, the battle was important only in its relation to northern politics and opinion. The invasion of Maryland failed to become the coup de g~ciceto the northern war spirit, and Lee's retirement made uncertain the state of significant northern discontent with the war. Palmerston and a large majority of the Cabinet could not judge the immediate effect of the battle on northern opinion. That effect, they decided, could only be reliably measured by the results of the November election^.'^
